In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of such rules can be analysed, and show the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and regrouping-proofness even if agents' preferences are additive separable.
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Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number
367.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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