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Overconfidence and Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa () (School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

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Abstract

In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework in which principal and agent knowingly hold asymmetric beliefs regarding the prob- ability of success of their enterprise. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an overconfident agent disproportionately values success- contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered incentives. On the other hand, if the agent is overconfident in particular about the extent to which his actions affect the likelihood of success, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort level. If the agent is overall moderately overconfident, the latter effect dominates; because the agent bears less risk in this case, he actually benefits from his overconfidence. If the agent is significantly overcon- fident, the former effect dominates; the agent is then exposed to an excessive amount of risk, which is harmful to him. An increase in overconfidence - either about the base probability of success or the extent to which effort affects it - makes it more likely that high levels of effort are implemented in equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2007-08.

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Length: 43
Date of creation: 10 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2007-08

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Related research
Keywords: overconfidence; heterogeneous beliefs; moral hazard;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2005. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2661-2700, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fang, Hanming & Moscarini, Giuseppe, 2005. "Morale hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 749-777, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000341, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gervais, Simon & Odean, Terrance, 2001. "Learning to be Overconfident," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    Other versions:
  8. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Kostas Koufopoulos, 2002. "Asymmetric Information, Heterogeneity in Risk Perceptions and Insurance: An Explanation to a Puzzle," FMG Discussion Papers dp402, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2003. "Positive self-image in tournaments," MPRA Paper 3140, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Van den Steen, Eric, 2005. "Too Motivated?," Working papers 18180, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  13. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2003. "Positive self-image and incentives in organizations," MPRA Paper 3141, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2003. "Positive self-image in tournaments," MPRA Paper 3140, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
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