This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Overconfidence in a Career-Concerns Setting

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Leonidas Enrique De La Rosa ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study the effects of overconfidence in a two-period investment-decision agency setting. Under common priors, agent risk aversion implies inefficiently low first-period investment. In our model, principal and agent disagree about the profitability of the investment decision conditional on a given public signal. An overconfident agent believes that the principal will update her beliefs upwards more often than not. As a consequence, the agent overestimates the benefits of learning from first-period investment. This implies that agent overconfidence mitigates the agency problems arising from the agent’s career concerns, even though an overconfident agent bears more project and reputational risk in equilibrium.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2405.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 2405.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2405

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: overconfidence; heterogenous beliefs; career concerns;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Tobias Adrian & Mark M. Westerfield, 2008. "Disagreement and learning in a dynamic contracting model," Staff Reports 269, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2003. "Positive self-image and incentives in organizations," MPRA Paper 3141, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gervais, Simon & Odean, Terrance, 2001. "Learning to be Overconfident," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    Other versions:
  4. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "Cursed Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1993. "Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 127-35, April.
    Other versions:
  6. Simon Gervais & Itay Goldstein, 2007. "The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms," Review of Finance, Oxford University Press for European Finance Association, vol. 11(3), pages 453-496. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Ricart i Costa, Joan, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 835-60, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Pinto, Luis Santos, 2007. "Positive Self-Image and Incentives in Organizations," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp509, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.