Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects

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Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects

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Benjamin Hermalin.

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Benjamin Hermalin

Abstract

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 91-168.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1991
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:91-168

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Article
- Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1993. "Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 127-35, April.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Katz, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series 1004, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Industrial Organization 9402001, EconWPA, revised 15 Nov 1996. [Downloadable!]
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-291, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Economics Working Papers E00-272, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Finance 9912001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Economics Working Papers 94-227, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Leonidas Enrique De La Rosa, 2008. "Overconfidence in a Career-Concerns Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Antoine Renucci & Frédéric Loss, 2004. "When Promotions Induce Good Managers to Be Lazy," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 263, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

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