Positive Self-Image In Tournaments
AbstractThis article analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent's self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers' productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The article shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms can benefit from worker positive self-image. The article also shows that worker positive self-image can improve welfare in tournaments. In contrast, workers' utility declines due to their own misguided choices. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
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