Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Does money matter in the ECB strategy? New evidence based on ECB communication

Contents:

Author Info

  • Helge Berger
  • Jakob de Haan
  • Jan‐Egbert Sturm

Abstract

We examine the role of money in the policies of the ECB, using introductory statements of the ECB President at the monthly press conferences during 1999-2004. Over time, the relative amount of words devoted to the monetary analysis has decreased. Our analysis of indicators of the monetary policy stance suggests that developments in the monetary sector, while somewhat more important in the later half of the sample, only played a minor role most of the time. Our estimates of ECB interest rate decisions suggest that the ECB’s words (monetary-sector based policy intensions) are not an important determinant of its actions.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal International Journal of Finance & Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 16-31

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:16:y:2011:i:1:p:16-31

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.interscience.wiley.com/jpages/1076-9307/

Order Information:
Web: http://jws-edcv.wiley.com/jcatalog/JournalsCatalogOrder/JournalOrder?PRINT_ISSN=1076-9307

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alvaro Aguiar & Manuel Martins, 2008. "Testing for asymmetries in the preferences of the euro-area monetary policymaker," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(13), pages 1651-1667.
  2. David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2004. "Look Who's Talking: ECB communication during the first years of EMU," DNB Working Papers 007, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Cukierman, A., 1999. "The Inflation Bias Result Revisited," Papers 38-99, Tel Aviv.
  4. RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2002. "Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence," Cahiers de recherche 2002-07, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  5. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Sandra Waller, 2005. "The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262042266, December.
  6. Fratzscher, Marcel, 2004. "Communication and exchange rate policy," Working Paper Series 0363, European Central Bank.
  7. Cukierman, Alex & Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 3761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Stefan Gerlach, 2004. "The two pillars of the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 19(40), pages 389-439, October.
  9. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2005. "Is ECB Communication Effective?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0682, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Donald W.K. Andrews & Werner Ploberger, 1992. "Optimal Tests When a Nuisance Parameter Is Present Only Under the Alternative," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1015, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Alex Cukierman & Anton Muscatelli, 2001. "Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?," Working Papers 2002_4, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Mar 2002.
  12. Albert Jaeger, 2003. "The ECB'S Money Pillar," IMF Working Papers 03/82, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Kai Carstensen & Roberta Colavecchio, 2004. "Did the Revision of the ECB Monetary Policy Strategy Affect the Reaction Function?," Kiel Working Papers 1221, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  14. Jansen, David-Jan & De Haan, Jakob, 2005. "Talking heads: the effects of ECB statements on the euro-dollar exchange rate," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 343-361, March.
  15. Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0106, Banco de Espa�a.
  16. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2000. "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, 09.
  17. Hansen, Bruce E, 1997. "Approximate Asymptotic P Values for Structural-Change Tests," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 15(1), pages 60-67, January.
  18. Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "Recession Aversion, Output and the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 3687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Breusch, T S, 1978. "Testing for Autocorrelation in Dynamic Linear Models," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(31), pages 334-55, December.
  20. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
  21. Charles Goodhart, 1998. "Central Bankers and Uncertainty," FMG Special Papers sp106, Financial Markets Group.
  22. Godfrey, Leslie G, 1978. "Testing against General Autoregressive and Moving Average Error Models When the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1293-1301, November.
  23. Issing, Otmar, 2001. "The Euro Area and the Single Monetary Policy," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 277-88, October.
  24. Heinemann, Friedrich & Ullrich, Katrin, 2005. "Does it Pay to Watch Central Bankers' Lips? The Information Content of ECB Wording," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  25. Otmar Issing, 2001. "The EURO Area and the single monetary policy," Working Papers 44, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:16:y:2011:i:1:p:16-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.