Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

National influences inside the ECB: an assessment from central bankers' statements

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hamza Bennani

    (EQUIPPE - ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE, INTEGRATION, POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET ECONOMETRIE - Université Lille I - Sciences et technologies - Université Lille II - Droit et santé - Université Lille III - Sciences humaines et sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper aims at discovering the national influences inside the Governing Council of the ECB for setting interest rates. We use a textual analysis of national newspaper articles related to each European central banker to analyze their expressed preferences. We proceed to a cluster analysis with the results obtained and fi nd that there were favorable conditions for the emergence of coalitions of central bankers according to their common economic concerns. Next, a Taylor rule of each coalition is estimated as well as their desired interest rate. Finally, we assess the contribution of each coalition in setting the interest rate fixed by the ECB. Our results show that the identi fied coalitions have an influence inside the Governing Council for setting the interest rate, that is approximately equal to their respective economic weight in the euro area.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hal.univ-lille3.fr/docs/00/99/26/46/PDF/24225_2012_-_20_DT.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00992646.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00992646

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.univ-lille3.fr/hal-00992646
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: Taylor rule ; European Central Bank ; monetary policy ; cluster analysis ; decision making process ; coalition formation;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2004. "Look Who's Talking: ECB communication during the first years of EMU," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 007, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. John Shea, 1996. "Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: A Simple Measure," NBER Technical Working Papers 0193, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea, 2007. "The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 103-112, July.
    4. Gaspar, Vítor & Pérez Quirós, Gabriel & Sicilia, Jorge, 2001. "The ECB monetary policy strategy and the money market," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0069, European Central Bank.
    5. Stephan Sauer & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2007. "Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 375-398, 08.
    6. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1998. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," NBER Working Papers 6442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies. 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    8. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
    9. Paolo Angelini & Paolo Del Giovane & Stefano Siviero & Daniele Terlizzese, 2008. "Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: What Role for Regional Information?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, September.
    10. Helge Berger & Jakob Haan, 2002. "Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(3), pages 263-282, September.
    11. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2011. "Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2011-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    12. Paul Degrauwe & Hans Dewachter & Yunus Aksoy, 1998. "The European Central Bank: Decision Rules and Macroeconomic Performance," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën ces9834, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
    13. Heinemann, Friedrich & Huefner, Felix P., 2002. "Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-69, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    14. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 964-985, September.
    15. Alvaro Aguiar & Manuel Martins, 2008. "Testing for asymmetries in the preferences of the euro-area monetary policymaker," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(13), pages 1651-1667.
    16. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & Havrilesky, Thomas M & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218, February.
    17. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1998. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," CFS Working Paper Series 1998/16, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    18. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, 05.
    19. Gerdesmeier, Dieter & Roffia, Barbara, 2003. "Empirical estimates of reaction functions for the euro area," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0206, European Central Bank.
    20. Oosterloo, Sander & de Haan, Jakob, 2004. "Central banks and financial stability: a survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 257-273, December.
    21. Fourcans, Andre & Vranceanu, Radu, 2004. "The ECB interest rate rule under the Duisenberg presidency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 579-595, September.
    22. Horvath, Roman & Rusnak, Marek & Smidkova, Katerina & Zapal, Jan, 2011. "Dissent voting behavior of central bankers: what do we really know?," MPRA Paper 34638, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2007. "The Role of the Bias in Crafting Consensus: FOMC Decision Making in the Greenspan Era," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(2), pages 39-60, June.
    24. Pierre L. Siklos & Martin T. Bohl, 2007. "Asset Prices as Indicators of Euro Area Monetary Policy: An Empirical Assessment of Their Role in a Taylor Rule," Working Paper Series, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis 32-07, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Jul 2007.
    25. Franka Liedorp & Robert Mosch & Carin van der Cruijsen & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Transparency of Banking Supervisors," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 61(2), pages 310-335, June.
    26. Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2008. "Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," MPRA Paper 9100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    27. MOONS, Cindy & VAN POECK, André, 2005. "Does one size fit all? A Taylor-rule based analysis of monetary policy for current and future EMU members," Working Papers 2005026, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    28. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
    29. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2005. "Is ECB Communication Effective?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0682, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    30. Sousa, Pedro, 2009. "Do ECB Council Decisions represent always a Real Euro Consensus?," Working Papers 9/2009, Universidade Portucalense, Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE).
    31. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2007. "Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2-3), pages 509-541, 03.
    32. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2003. "Monetary Policy Announcements and Money Markets: A Transatlantic Perspective," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 309-28, Winter.
    33. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00992646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.