This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alex Cukierman
Anton Muscatelli

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation and output by policymakers on interest-rate reaction functions. A theoretical framework which makes it possible to identify the dominant type of asymmetry is developed and related to the precautionary demand of pol- icymakers for expansions and for low inßation. Using data for some G7 economies, the paper shows that, except for Germany, nonlinear and asym- metric behaviour is present. A main Þnding is that where credibility-building and disinflation has already been achieved, the monetary authorities develop a greater precautionary demand for output expansions than for low inflation. This may generate a new type of inflation bias. Conversely, where credibility- building is still a concern for the authorities, managing the business cycle is dominated by concerns of the monetary authorities to keep inflation expec- tations low.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_22250_en.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2002_4.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2001
Date of revision: Mar 2002
Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2002_4

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Adam Smith Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RT
Phone: 0141 330 4618
Fax: 0141 330 4940
Web page: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jeanette Findlay).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 1998. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," FMG Discussion Papers dp306, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Cukierman, A., 1999. "The Inflation Bias Result Revisited," Papers 38-99, Tel Aviv.
  6. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, January.
  10. Dolado, Juan J. & María-Dolores, Ramón & Naveira Barrero, Manuel, 2000. "Asymmetries In Monetary Policy Rules: Evidence For Four Central Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 2441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2004. "The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 91-107, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 1989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules And Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence And Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. W.H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," CEP Discussion Papers dp0423, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  18. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Nicoletta Batini & Andrew G Haldane, . "Forward-looking rules for monetary policy," Bank of England working papers 91, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Muscatelli, V Anton & Tirelli, Patrizio & Trecroci, Carmine, 2002. "Does Institutional Change Really Matter? Inflation Targets, Central Bank Reform and Interest Rate Policy in the OECD Countries," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(4), pages 487-527, Special I. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.