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A Test of Shirking under Legislative and Citizen Vote: The Case of State Lottery Adoption

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  • Garrett, Thomas A

Abstract

Legislators vote on numerous issues, many of which are not offered for citizen vote. As a result, most previous studies of legislative shirking have used only data on legislators' votes and the characteristics of the legislators' constituencies. The case of state lottery adoption allows a direct test of how well legislators voted according to the preferences of their constituencies, since both voters and legislators voted on the issue. In addition, the legislative vote on lottery adoption occurred before the citizen vote, thus forcing legislators to accurately forecast constituency preferences. Examining West Virginia legislators, I first find the lottery preferences of each legislator's average and core constituencies. I then compare each legislator's actual vote on lottery adoption to his or her predicted vote. After considering all possible determinants of legislators' votes, I find an average of 28 percent of West Virginia legislators still failed to vote according to their constituencies' majority preferences. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 189-208

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:42:y:1999:i:1:p:189-208

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/

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Cited by:
  1. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2014. "Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 207-229, June.
  2. Humphreys, Brad & Perez, Levi, 2011. "Lottery Participants and Revenues: An International Survey of Economic Research on Lotteries," Working Papers 2011-17, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
  3. Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann, 2012. "A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 244-260, September.
  4. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013. "Quantifying parliamentary representation of constituents’ preferences with quasi-experimental data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 170-180.
  5. Garrett, Thomas A. & Marsh, Thomas L., 2002. "The revenue impacts of cross-border lottery shopping in the presence of spatial autocorrelation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 501-519, July.
  6. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013. "How do Female Preferences Influence Political Decisions by Female and Male Representatives?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79748, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  7. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2012. "Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 312-314.

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