Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power
AbstractWe match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 114 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Median voter model; Political representation; Constituents’ preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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