Preference Representation and the Influence of Political Parties in Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems: An Almost Ideal Empirical Test
AbstractElectoral systems determine the role party affiliations play in political representation. According to conventional expectations, politiciansâ€™ party affiliations should influence political representation when they are elected by proportional representation. In contrast, majoritarian systems force politicians to converge to the median position of their constituents, and party affiliation should play no or at least a much smaller role. We test these predictions with unique quasi-experimental data within a common party system by matching referenda decisions of constituents with voting behavior of their representatives, who are elected either by a majoritarian system or proportional representation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2012-03.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Constituents' Preferences; Party Influence; Median Voter Model; Political Economy;
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- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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