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Preference Representation and the Influence of Political Parties in Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems: An Almost Ideal Empirical Test

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  • David Stadelmann
  • Marco Portmann
  • Reiner Eichenberger

Abstract

Electoral systems determine the role party affiliations play in political representation. According to conventional expectations, politicians’ party affiliations should influence political representation when they are elected by proportional representation. In contrast, majoritarian systems force politicians to converge to the median position of their constituents, and party affiliation should play no or at least a much smaller role. We test these predictions with unique quasi-experimental data within a common party system by matching referenda decisions of constituents with voting behavior of their representatives, who are elected either by a majoritarian system or proportional representation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2012-03.

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Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2012-03

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Related research

Keywords: Constituents' Preferences; Party Influence; Median Voter Model; Political Economy;

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Cited by:
  1. Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 215-238, September.
  2. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences—a reply and new perspectives," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 149-151, January.

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