When queueing is better than push and shove
AbstractWe address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Other versions of this item:
- Gershkov, Alex & Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "When queueing is better than push and shove," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 144, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "When Queuening is Better than Push and Shove," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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