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On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting and Transferring of Jobs

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  • Moulin, Herve

    (Rice U)

Abstract

A deterministic server is shared by users with identical linear waiting costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. Shortest jobs are served first for efficiency. The server can monitor the length of a job, but not the identity of its user, thus merging, splitting or partially transferring jobs offer cooperative strategic opportunities. Can we design cash transfers to neutralize such manipulations? We prove that merge-proofness and split-proofness are not compatible, and that it is similarly impossible to prevent all transfers of jobs involving three agents or more. On the other hand, robustness against pair-wise transfers is feasible, and essentially characterize a one-dimensional set of scheduling methods. This line is borne by two outstanding methods, the merge-proof S+ and the split-proof S?. Splitproofness, unlike Mergeproofness, is not compatible with several simple tests of equity. Thus the two properties are far from equally demanding.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, Herve, 2004. "On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting and Transferring of Jobs," Working Papers 2004-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2004-04
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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2004papers/schedfees4.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Progressivity, Inequality Reduction, and Merging-Proofness in Taxation," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200603, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2006.
    2. Fan Zhang & Pramode Verma, 2011. "Pricing multi-class network services using the Shapley Value," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 61-75, April.
    3. Moulin, Hervé, 2008. "Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 567-587, July.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    5. Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.

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