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Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

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  • Kazuhiko Hashimoto

    ()
    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

  • Hiroki Saitoh

    ()
    (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

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    Abstract

    In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.

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    File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0817.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 08-17.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0817

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    Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Queueing Problems; Strategy-Proofness; Anonymity in welfare; Efficiency;

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    1. Mitra, Manipushpak, 2005. "Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(1), pages 251-266, August.
    2. Maniquet, F., 2000. "A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems," Papers 222, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    3. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
    4. Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.
    5. Manipushpak Mitra, 2001. "Mechanism design in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 277-305.
    6. Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2006. "Group Strategyproofness in Queueing Models," Economics Discussion Papers 610, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. Chun, Youngsub, 2006. "A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 171-181, March.
    8. Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August.
    9. Manipushpak Mitra, 2002. "Achieving the first best in sequencing problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 75-91.
    10. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
    11. Youngsub Chun & Eun Jeong Heo, 2007. "Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers," ISER Discussion Paper 0683, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0648, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Ando, Kazutoshi & Kato, Miki & Ohseto, Shinji, 2008. "Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 14-23, January.
    14. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
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