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When queueing is better than push and shove

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Author Info
Alex Gershkov (University of Bonn, Department of Economics, Economic Theory II, Lennéstrasse 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Tel: +49 228737993, Fax: +49 228737940, alex.gershkov@uni-bonn.de)
Paul Schweinzer (Department of Economics, University of Bonn Lennéstraße 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany paul.schweinzer@uni-bonn.de)

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Abstract

We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 144.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:144

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Related research
Keywords: Scheduling; Queueing; Mechanism design;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Maniquet, F., 2000. "A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems," Papers 222, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    Other versions:
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2004. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time," Discussion Papers 5, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998. [Downloadable!]
  9. MISHRA, Debasis & RANGARAJAN, Bharath, 2005. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," CORE Discussion Papers 2005053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  10. Pettersen Strandenes, Siri & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2005. "Efficient (re-)scheduling: An auction approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 187-192, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Manipushpak Mitra, 2000. "Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1301, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  12. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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