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An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fang, Hanming
Norman, Peter
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This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents\' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we characterize the optimal mechanism, and show that it involves bundling. Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it can increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions.
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Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number
norman-04-11-21-09-39-13.
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Date of creation: 21 Nov 2004Date of revision:
08 Feb 2005Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-04-11-21-09-39-13Contact details of provider:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Peters).
Keywords: Bundling ; Public Good Provision ; Exclusion ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006.
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Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005.
"Overcoming Participation Constraints ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1511, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!] Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2005.
"Overcoming Participation Constraints ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
norman-05-04-22-05-35-30, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 28 Apr 2005.
[Downloadable!] Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2004.
"An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Feb 2005.
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"Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision ,"
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