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Scoring Auctions

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  • Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

Abstract

In this article we provide a brief survey of the literature on ‘scoring auctions’. We start with the benchmark model of the traditional auction theory and then proceed to the literature on scoring auctions. We first discuss the pioneering work of Che (1993) in detail. Then we review the major papers in the literature that extend and generalize the Che (1993) model. Thereafter, we discuss the recent results with non-quasilinear scoring rules. In the concluding section we pose some possible research questions for interested scholars in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, 2014. "Scoring Auctions," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 2(1), pages 35-48, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:miceco:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:35-48
    DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522729
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. NAKABAYASHI Jun & HIROSE Yohsuke, 2016. "Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model," Discussion papers 16008, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    2. Koning, Pierre & van de Meerendonk, Arthur, 2014. "The impact of scoring weights on price and quality outcomes: An application to the procurement of Welfare-to-Work contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-14.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
    4. Oecd, 2011. "Centralised Purchasing Systems in the European Union," SIGMA Papers 47, OECD Publishing.
    5. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
    6. Makoto HANAZONO & Jun NAKABAYASHI & Masanori TSURUOKA, 2013. "Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation," KIER Working Papers 845, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    7. Wang, Hong, 2013. "Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 404-413.
    8. Menezes, Flavio M., 2008. "An Introduction to Auction Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199275991, Decembrie.
    9. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    10. Maria M. Wihardja, 2010. "Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions: Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, And Empirical Study," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 35-57, March.
    11. Liu, Shulin & Li, Jun & Liu, De, 2012. "Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 408-411.
    12. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    13. Fernando Branco, 1997. "The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 63-81, Spring.
    14. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Riccardo Camboni Marchi Adani, 2018. "Procuring price and quality using scoring auctions: where do we stand?," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 17-36, March.

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