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Combinatorial Auctions for Player Selection in the Indian Premier League (IPL)

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  • Soumyakanti Chakraborty
  • Anup K. Sen
  • Amitava Bagchi

Abstract

In 2008, the benefits of team formation by auction first became apparent in the field of professional cricket. The Indian Premier League organized sequential single-item auctions to allocate 77 cricketers to eight teams that participated in a Twenty20 cricket tournament. We argue in this article that the auction format used resulted in distortion of player valuations. We recommend a combinatorial auction scheme MRPF which enables bidders to exploit the complementary nature of the resources. A laboratory experiment undertaken to test the feasibility of MRPF indicated that it would result in a more efficient auction system.

Suggested Citation

  • Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions for Player Selection in the Indian Premier League (IPL)," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(1), pages 86-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:16:y:2015:i:1:p:86-107
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002512470141
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    References listed on IDEAS

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