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Bid Average Methods in Procurement

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Author Info
Gian Luigi Albano () (Consip S.p.A., Rome)
Milo Bianchi () (Stockholm School of Economics)
Giancarlo Spagnolo () (Consip S.p.A., Rome and Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

Procurement awarding mechanisms based on average price have been advocated to soften price competition and reduce cost overruns. We show that their theoretical support is shaky. When the bid closest to the average is awarded, firms submit identical bids, making the selection extremely costly and random, without reducing opportunistic behaviors ex-post. When instead the bid closest and below the average is awarded, the equilibrium is very sensitive to firms' production and participation costs. Either it displays tougher competition than in a first price auction, or it induces firms to randomize their bids.

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File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2006/gen-feb/albano_bianchi.php
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Publisher Info
Article provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.

Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
Pages: 41-62
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Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:41-62

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
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  1. Decio Coviello & Mario Mariniello, 2008. "Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 189, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.


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