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Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design Theory

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  • Committee, Nobel Prize

    (Nobel Prize Committee)

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    Abstract

    Scientific Background, The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Economic transactions take place in markets, within firms and under a host of other institutional arrangements. Some markets are free of government intervention while others are regulated. Within firms, some transactions are guided by market prices, some are negotiated, and yet others are dictated by management. Mechanism design theory provides a coherent framework for analyzing this great variety of institutions, or "allocation mechanisms", with a focus on the problems associated with incentives and private information.

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    File URL: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/advanced-economicsciences2007.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2007-2.

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    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 15 Oct 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_002

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    Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org

    Related research

    Keywords: Mechanism Design; Asymmetric Information;

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    1. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
    2. Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin, 2003. "Mechanism Design for the Environment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000341, David K. Levine.
    3. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    4. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    8. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "What Really Matters in Auction Design, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
      [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
      ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
    9. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    10. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Survey of Auction Theory, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
      [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
      ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
    11. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
    12. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
    13. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
    14. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
      [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
      ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
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