This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design Theory

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee)
Abstract

Scientific Background, The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Economic transactions take place in markets, within firms and under a host of other institutional arrangements. Some markets are free of government intervention while others are regulated. Within firms, some transactions are guided by market prices, some are negotiated, and yet others are dictated by management. Mechanism design theory provides a coherent framework for analyzing this great variety of institutions, or "allocation mechanisms", with a focus on the problems associated with incentives and private information.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/ecoadv07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2007-2.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 15 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_002

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

Related research
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Asymmetric Information;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.