Voice matters in a dictator game
AbstractWe examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before the dictator dictates his/her offer. In this game, it is predicted not only by the standard game theory, but by the behavioral game theory such as theories of other-regarding preferences, that the dictator's offer is independent of the recipient's request. Some findings based on our data are as follows: the above independence hypothesis is rejected; as the recipient's request increases, the dictator's offer increases when the requests are less than 50% of the pie; on the other hand, when the request goes beyond 50% of the pie, the offer decreases as the request increases. That is, "voice" matters in a dictator game. We also conduct a clustering analysis to classify dictators' behaviour into some notable patterns. As a result, we obtain the following three behavioural patterns: the other-disregarding, the punishing the greedy, and the lenient.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Communication; Voice; Dictator game; Economic experiment; C72; C91; D64;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
- Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June.
- Oxoby, Robert J. & McLeish, Kendra N., 2004. "Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 399-405, September.
- Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
- Ogawa, Kazuhito & Takemoto, Toru & Takahashi, Hiromasa & Suzuki, Akihiro, 2012. "Income earning opportunity and work performance affect donating behavior: Evidence from dictator game experiments," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 816-826.
- Takanori Ida & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2010. "Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount rates," Discussion papers e-10-013, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
- Maroš Servátka, 2007.
"Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game,"
Working Papers in Economics
07/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.
- Takanori Ida & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2012. "Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount rates," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 314-329, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.