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Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment with a Representative Subject Pool

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Author Info
Charles Bellemare () (Université Laval, CIRPÉE and IZA)
Sabine Kröger () (Université Laval)
Arthur van Soest () (RAND, Tilburg University and IZA)

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Abstract

We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player’s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3022.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3022

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Related research
Keywords: inequity aversion; intentions; subjective expectations;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Huck, Steffen, 1999. "Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 183-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lea, Stephen E. G. & Webley, Paul, 1997. "Pride in economic psychology," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(2-3), pages 323-340, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. W. Güth & C. Schmidt & M. Sutter, . "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet - A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2001-42, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    Other versions:
  4. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Oxoby, Robert J. & McLeish, Kendra N., 2004. "Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 399-405, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bellemare, Charles & Kroger, Sabine, 2007. "On representative social capital," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 183-202, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bahry, Donna L. & Wilson, Rick K., 2006. "Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 37-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Charles Bellemare & Sabine Kröger & Arthur van Soest, 2008. "Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 815-839, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Manski, Charles F., 2002. "Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 880-891, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2005. "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 623-635, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Gary Charness & David I. Levine, 2007. "Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1051-1072, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ernst Fehr, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," SOEPpapers 154, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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