Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Equivalencia de Ingresos en un Duopolio Eléctrico

Contents:

Author Info

  • Estrella Alonso
  • Juan Tejada
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This article calculates the Bayes-Nash equilibria of a parametric family of auction models which includes, among others, the classic models. In an analysis of two power generation firms with the same production capacity and risk neutrality, the models in this class verify a revenue equivalence result.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/136alona.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía-Latin American Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 47 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 136 ()
    Pages: 191-215

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:47:y:2010:i:136:p:191-215

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Avda. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago
    Phone: (562) 354-4303
    Fax: (562) 553-1664
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.economia.puc.cl
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Email:

    Related research

    Keywords: Subastas; equilibrio bayesiano de Nash; mercado eléctrico;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Giulio Federico & David Rahman, 2001. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-W05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January.
    4. Parisio, Lucia & Bosco, Bruno, 2003. "Market Power and the Power Market: Multi-unit Bidding and (In)Efficiency in Electricity Auctions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 377-401, August.
    5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
    6. Nils-Henrik von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2002. "Competition in Electricity Spot Markets: Economic Theory and International Experience," Industrial Organization 0203006, EconWPA.
    7. Von der Fehr, N.H.M. & Harbord, D., 1992. "Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry," Memorandum 09/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:47:y:2010:i:136:p:191-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amparo García).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.