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Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns

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Author Info
Claeys, Sophie
Schoors, Koen

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 630-657
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:630-657

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ioannidou, Vasso P., 2005. "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Pyle, William, 2002. "Overbanked and Credit-Starved: A Paradox of the Transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wall, Larry D. & Peterson, David R., 1990. "The effect of Continental Illinois' failure on the financial performance of other banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-99, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 1999. "Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect," IMF Working Papers 99/106, International Monetary Fund.
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  5. Kane, Edward J, 2000. "Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 671-701, August.
  6. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 99/39, International Monetary Fund.
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  9. Koen Schoors, 2001. "The credit squeeze during Russia's early transition: A bank-based view," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 9(1), pages 205-228, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Leena Mörttinen & Paolo Poloni & Patrick Sandars & Jukka Vesala, 2005. "Analysing banking sector conditions - how to use macro-prudential indicators," Occasional Paper Series 26, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  14. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2000. "Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression," NBER Working Papers 7919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
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  17. Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J., 1994. "A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 272-299, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno & Rochet, Jean Charles, 1999. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 2325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Alonso, Irasema, 1996. "On avoiding bank runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 73-87, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Irina Slinko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Evgeny Yakovlev, 2005. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 284-318. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Laeven, Luc, 2001. "Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 207-229, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
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  26. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 11-23. [Downloadable!]
  28. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 671-705.
  29. Christopher Sleet & Bruce D. Smith, 2000. "Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort functions," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 518-579.
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  30. A. Karas & K. Schoors, 2005. "Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstructing a database of Russian banks," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/327, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Fungáová, Zuzana & Godlewski , Christophe J. & Weill, Laurent, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Fungacova, Zuzana & Weill, Laurent, 2009. "How market power influences bank failures: Evidence from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
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