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On the limits to rational learning

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  • Young, H. Peyton

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  • Young, H. Peyton, 2002. "On the limits to rational learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 791-799, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:4-5:p:791-799
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    1. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
    2. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
    3. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
    4. John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
    5. Dean Foster & H Peyton Young, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Economics Working Paper Archive 423, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2001.
    6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    7. Jordan J. S., 1995. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 8-20, April.
    8. John H. Nachbar, 2001. "Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 303-326.
    9. Yaw Nyarko, 1998. "Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 643-655.
    10. Jean-Michel Grandmont, 1998. "Expectations Formation and Stability of Large Socioeconomic Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 741-782, July.
    11. Ronald Miller & Chris Sanchirico, "undated". "Almost Everybody Disagrees Almost All the Time: The Genericity of Weakly Merging Nowhere," Scholarship at Penn Law upenn_wps-1001, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
    12. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
    13. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Anke Gerber, "undated". "Learning in and about Games," IEW - Working Papers 234, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.

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