Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors
AbstractConsider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs of players (weaker than mutual absolute continuity). Then any limit point of beliefs of players about the future of the game conditional on the past lies in the set of Nash or Subjective equilibria. Our assumption does not require common priors so is weaker than Jordan (1991); however our conclusion is weaker, we obtain convergence to subjective and not necessarily Nash equilibria. Our model is a generalization of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993) model. Our assumption is weaker than theirs. However, our conclusion is also weaker, and shows that limit points of beliefs, and not actual play, are subjective equilibria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: March 3, 1995; revised version: February 17, 1997
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997.
"Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning,"
1177, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gregory Price, 2008. "NEA Presidential Address: Black Economists of the World You Cite!!," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, March.
- Young, H. Peyton, 2002. "On the limits to rational learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 791-799, May.
- John H. Nachbar, 2003.
"Beliefs in Repeated Games,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0597, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2014. "Learning a Population Distribution," Discussion Paper Series 1401, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.