Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information
Abstract
In Nachbar [20] and, more definitively, Nachbar [22], I argued that, for a large class of discounted infinitely repeated games of complete information (i.e. stage game payoff functions are common knowledge), it is impossible to construct a Bayesian learning theory in which player beliefs are simultaneously weakly cautious, symmetric, and consistent. The present paper establishes a similar impossibility theorem for repeated games of incomplete information, that is, for repeated games in which stage game payoff functions are private information.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 303-326
Note: Received: 15 October 1997/Accepted: 17 March 1999
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Young, H. Peyton, 2002. "On the limits to rational learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 791-799, May.
- Dean Foster & H Peyton Young, 1999.
"On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
423, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2001.
- Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2001. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Working Papers 01-08-039, Santa Fe Institute.
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003.
"Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
- Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- John H. Nachbar, 2005.
"Beliefs in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, 03.
- John H. Nachbar, 2003. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 0597, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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