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Bargaining and Destructive Power

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Author Info

  • Partha Dasgupta

    (University of Cambridge)

  • Eric S. Maskin

    (Institute for Advanced Study)

Abstract

We explore the effect that the power to destroy the feasible set has on two-person bargaining outcomes.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 217-227

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Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2007:v:8:i:2:p:217-227

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Related research

Keywords: Bargaining; Axioms; Destruction;

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References

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  1. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June.
  2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  3. Starrett, David A, 1973. "A Note on Externalities and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(1), pages 179-83, January.
  4. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 120-154, June.
  5. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-61, July.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
  7. Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 232, David K. Levine.
  8. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  9. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-84, Part I Se.
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