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Value Solutions in Cooperative Games

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  • Roger A McCain

    (Drexel University, USA)

Abstract

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Roger A McCain, 2013. "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8528, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wsbook:8528
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    References listed on IDEAS

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