When Should Leaders Share Information with Their Subordinates?
Abstract"We show that when leaders share some of their information with subordinates, decision making is subject to a motivational bias; leaders make the decisions their subordinates want to see. As this bias increases with the quality of the shared information, an improvement of an organization's information might even decrease its efficiency. As a consequence, information sharing is not always optimal. We show however that self-confidence can help the leader to overcome his motivational bias, thus making information sharing more attractive. Conversely, we find that information sharing can help to curb the autocratic tendencies of a self-confident leadership. We conclude that a policy of information sharing and the appointment of a self-confident leadership are most effective when they go hand in hand." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 16 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Marc Möller, 2013. "Decision–Making and Implementation in Teams," CEP Discussion Papers dp1208, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2014. "Understanding Corporate Governance Through Learning Models of Managerial Competence," NBER Working Papers 20028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patrick Bolton & Markus K. Brunnermeier & Laura Veldkamp, 2008. "Leadership, Coordination and Mission-Driven Management," NBER Working Papers 14339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik, 2010.
"Pandering to Persuade,"
661465000000000197, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gürerk, Özgür & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rockenbach, Bettina, 2009. "Motivating teammates: The leader's choice between positive and negative incentives," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 591-607, August.
- Sergei Guriev & Anton Suvorov, 2010. "Why Less Informed Managers May Be Better Leaders," Working Papers w0142, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.