Is transparency an anti-corruption myth?

We look at the effect of transparency on the incidence of costly back-scratching in a laboratory setting. In our experimental design players have an incentive to form bilateral alliances in which they favour their partner at the expense of others. The transparency treatment uses player identification via photographs to lift the 'veil of ignorance' from those players having costs imposed on them from back-scratching of others. This treatment mimics 'identity-revealing' anti-corruption policies such as public disclosure of political donors and lobbyists, or the publication of political diaries with identities of meeting attendees. We find no improvement in overall group payoffs from transparency. A plausible story that fits our results is that there may be two countervailing forces at play. First, more rapid alliance formation due to social cues from the photographs being used as a coordination device to facilitate faster alliance formation between some players. Second, shorter alliances due to prosocial forces at the group level. We draw out lessons for policy makers about the limits of transparency in curtailing "grey" types of corruption.