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Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

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  • Omar Azfar

    ()

  • William Nelson

    ()

Abstract

We conducted an experimental analysis of the causes of corruption, varying the ease of hiding corrupt gains, officials’ wages, and the method of choosing the law enforcement officer. Voters rarely re-elect chief executives found to be corrupt and tend to choose presidents who had good luck. Directly elected law enforcement officers work more vigilantly at exposing corruption than those who are appointed. Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding corrupt gains both reduce corruption. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 130 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 471-493

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:471-493

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Keywords: Corruption; Development; Experiment; Separation of powers;

References

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  5. Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 1-35, 03.
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  7. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
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  9. International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Persson, T & Roland, G & Tabellini, G, 1996. "Sparation of Powers and Accountability : Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics," Papers 612, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  11. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 1737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  13. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
  15. Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  16. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow, 2005. "Intrinsic motivations on the development frontline: Do they exist? Do they endure?," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-033, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Roel van Veldhuizen, 2012. "The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma," Development and Comp Systems 0409035, EconWPA.
  4. van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-210, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  5. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Roel van Veldhuizen, 2012. "The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Timothy C. Salmon & Danila Serra, 2013. "Does Social Judgement Diminish Rule Breaking?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2013-05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Bj�rn Frank & Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Fr�d�ric Boehm, 2011. "Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 59-71, February.
  9. Omar Azfar, 2006. "The New Institutional Economics Approach to Economic Development: A Discussion of Social, Political, Legal, and Economic Institutions," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 965-980.
  10. Barr, Abigail & Lindelow, Magnus & Serneels, Pieter, 2009. "Corruption in public service delivery: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-239, October.
  11. Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Rajiv Sethi, 2007. "Attitudes and attributes: a field experiment with public officials and transfer recipients In Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 006881, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  12. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.

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