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Separation of powers and development

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Meleu, Mathieu

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 64 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 129-145

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:64:y:2001:i:1:p:129-145

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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References

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  1. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November.
  2. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
  4. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  5. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-33, Fall.
  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jérome Pouyet, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," series 0001, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Matematici - Università di Bari, revised Jun 2000.
  7. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-30, July.
  8. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-27, September.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  11. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  12. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Methieu, 1997. " Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 519-40, December.
  13. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  14. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
  15. Olsen, Trond E & Torsvik, Gaute, 1993. "The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 136-58, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2010-033, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Mishra, Ajit & Anant, T.C.A., 2006. "Activism, separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 457-477, December.
  3. Facundo Albornoz & Jayasri Dutta, 2007. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth in Latin America," Discussion Papers 07-06, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  4. Marie-Pierre Philippe-Dussine, 2011. "Analyse économique des choix publics locaux en matière de développement rural," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 1112, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2011.
  5. Gutierrez, Luis H., 2003. "Regulatory governance in the Latin American telecommunications sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 225-240, December.
  6. Omar Azfar & William Nelson, 2007. "Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 471-493, March.
  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2004. "Management of Public Utilities in China," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 185-210, November.
  8. T.C.A. Anant & Ajit Mishra, 2003. "Separation of Powers and Activism," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 151, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
  9. Daouda DIAKITÉ, 2008. "Régulation Et Développement : Une Analyse Théorique À Partir De L’Enforcement Et La Séparation Des Pouvoirs," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 28, pages 181-206.
  10. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2014. "Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 207-229, June.
  11. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Frensch, Richard, 2004. "Public governance as the source of quality and variety gains from transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 388-408, September.
  13. Stern, J., 2000. "Electricity and telecommunications regulatory institutions in small and developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 131-157, September.

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