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Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments

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  • Bj�rn Frank

    (University of Kassel, Germany)

  • Johann Graf Lambsdorff

    (Passau University, Germany)

  • Fr�d�ric Boehm

    (Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla, Colombia)

Abstract

Reliable microdata on corrupt behavior are hard to obtain in the field, and available field data are hard to interpret. Laboratory corruption experiments have therefore recently gained in popularity, and those that shed light on gender effects are surveyed in this article. The tentative main result is this: if women are involved in a potentially corrupt transaction, it is more likely to fail. The reason is not that women are intrinsically more honest, but that they are more opportunistic when they have the chance to break an implicitly corrupt contract and less engaged in retaliating nonperformance. The survey closes with tentative implications for development policy.Les micro-données fiables sur les comportements de corruption sont difficiles à recueillir sur le terrain, et les données de terrain disponibles sont difficilement interprétables. Les expériences en laboratoire sur la corruption gagnent donc, depuis quelques temps, en popularité. Celles qui mettent en lumière les effets de genre sont examinées dans cet article. Un premier constat provisoire est celui ci: Si des femmes sont impliquées dans une transaction potentiellement frauduleuse, la probabilité d’échec de cette dernière est plus élevée. La raison n’en n’est pas que les femmes sont intrinsèquement plus honnêtes, mais plutôt qu’elles sont plus opportunistes lorsqu’il s’agit de rompre un contrat teinté de corruption et moins enclines à réagir face à des performances insatisfaisantes. L’étude conclut en décrivant des implications possibles pour les politiques de développement.’

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal European Journal of Development Research.

Volume (Year): 23 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 59-71

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Handle: RePEc:pal:eurjdr:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:59-71

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References

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  1. Fernando Aguiar & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Natalia Jiménez & Luis Miller, 2007. "Are women expected to be more generous?," ThE Papers 07/08, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.
  2. Fahr, René & Djawadi, Behnud Mir, 2012. "The impact of risk perception and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior: Evidence from a petty corruption experiment," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62022, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Frank, Björn, 2011. "Corrupt reciprocity - Experimental evidence on a men's game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 116-125, June.
  4. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2012. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised May 2013.
  5. Klaus Abbink & Utteeyo Dasgupta & Lata Gangadharan & Tarun Jain, 2013. "Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 62-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  6. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-210, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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