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Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. repec:cam:camjip:2525 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
  3. Alexander Matros & Constantine Sorokin, 2026. "Suppression and Empowerment in Contests," Papers 2605.26639, arXiv.org.
  4. Christian Ewerhart, 2024. "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," ECON - Working Papers 457, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  5. Balart, Pau & Casas, Agustin & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2022. "Technological change, campaign spending and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  6. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 167-170.
  7. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023. "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers 2317, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  8. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
  9. Guang-Zhen Sun, 2025. "The Power of Passivity in the Hirshleifer Contest Under Small Noise," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-20, August.
  10. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
  11. Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2024. "Interconnected Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2408, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  12. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2022. "Success in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 595-624, April.
  13. Balart, Pau & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2017. "Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 126-130.
  14. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
  15. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions," ECON - Working Papers 155, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  16. Gehrig, Thomas & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2022. "Intermediation and price volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  17. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
  18. Robertson, Matthew J., 2025. "Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 250(C).
  19. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
  20. Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2564, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  21. Segev, Ella, 2020. "Crowdsourcing contests," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 241-255.
  22. Paul Pecorino, 2020. "Bridge burning and escape routes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 399-414, September.
  23. Daniel Graydon Stephenson, 2023. "Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields," Working Papers 2303, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
  24. Jorg Franke & Shasi Nandeibam, 2021. "Efficient Probabilistic Fines Under Negative Externalities," Department of Economics Working Papers 86/21, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  25. Doron Klunover & John Morgan, 2018. "A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort," Papers 1809.04436, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
  26. Osório António, 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-17, July.
  27. Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2024. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 300-320.
  28. repec:cam:camjip:2403 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Ewerhart, Christian, 2025. "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
  30. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," Working Papers 2072/306550, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  31. Ewerhart, Christian, 2024. "A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 52-59.
  32. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 61-64.
  33. Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022. "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
  34. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
  35. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  36. Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022. "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers 2203, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  37. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2024. "Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 526-556.
  38. Siyuan Fan & Zhonghong Kuang & Jingfeng Lu, 2026. "Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design," Papers 2602.21564, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
  39. Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022. "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  40. Bo Chen & Shanlin Jin, 2023. "Elimination contests with collusive team players," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 61-89, February.
  41. repec:lan:wpaper:156630581 is not listed on IDEAS
  42. Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
  43. Nicolas de Roos & Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov, 2024. "Elimination tournaments with resource constraints," Working Papers 2024-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  44. Marcin Dziubi'nski & Sanjeev Goyal & Junjie Zhou, 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Papers 2510.11452, arXiv.org.
  45. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  46. Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang & Lixue Zhou, 2023. "Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 303-332, March.
  47. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  48. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024. "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers 2409, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  49. Ben J. Heijdra & Pim Heijnen, 2024. "Efficiency and equity: A general equilibrium analysis of rent‐seeking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
  50. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  51. Jia, Hao & Sun, Ching-jen, 2021. "The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
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