Efficiency and Equity: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Rent-Seeking
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Ben J. Heijdra & Pim Heijnen, 2024. "Efficiency and equity: A general equilibrium analysis of rent‐seeking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
- Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," DELTA Working Papers 96-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 1494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008.
"Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218,
Springer.
- Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-414, May.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, Decembrie.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2015.
"Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 59-71, September.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests," ECON - Working Papers 143, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Rolf Aaberge, 2007.
"Gini’s nuclear family,"
The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 5(3), pages 305-322, December.
- Rolf Aaberge, 2006. "Gini's Nuclear Family," Discussion Papers 491, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2016.
"Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1225-1262.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2011. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," NBER Working Papers 17035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2014. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 5071, CESifo.
- Scheuer, Florian & Rothschild, Casey, 2014. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," CEPR Discussion Papers 10247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
- Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 158-167.
- Park, Hyun & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2005. "Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 830-850, December.
- Ben J. Heijdra & Yang Jiang & Jochen O. Mierau, 2019.
"The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk Under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information,"
De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(2), pages 177-213, June.
- Ben J. Heijdra & Yang Jiang & Jochen O. Mierau, 2017. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Longevity Risk under Private and Public Insurance and Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 6767, CESifo.
- A. D. Roy, 1951. "Some Thoughts On The Distribution Of Earnings," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 135-146.
- Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, 2013.
"Rent-Seeking, Market Structure, and Growth,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 878-901, July.
- Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, 2007. "Rent Seeking, Market Structure and Growth," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/03, European University Institute.
- Costas Azariadis & Allan Drazen, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 501-526.
- Benjamin B. Lockwood & Charles G. Nathanson & E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "Taxation and the Allocation of Talent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(5), pages 1635-1682.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016.
"Where are the rent seekers?,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the Rent Seekers?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5833, CESifo.
- Aleksandar Vasilev, 2013.
"On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework,"
Working Papers
2013_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," EconStor Preprints 142339, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-84, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Essays on Real Business Cycle Modeling and the Public Sector," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 130522.
- Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_13 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aidt, T. & Dutta, J. & Vania Sena, 2005. "Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of Threshold Effects: Theory and Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0540, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2016.
"Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1225-1262.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2011. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," NBER Working Papers 17035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2014. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 5071, CESifo.
- Scheuer, Florian & Rothschild, Casey, 2014. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," CEPR Discussion Papers 10247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Renato Gomes & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Alessandro Pavan, 2018.
"Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 511-557.
- Renato Gomes & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 5054, CESifo.
- Gomes, Renato & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pavan, Alessandro, 2017. "Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice," TSE Working Papers 17-773, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Renato Gomes & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice," Discussion Papers 1577, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Louis Kaplow, 2024. "Optimal Income Taxation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 637-738, June.
- Shin-Kun Peng, 2014. "Housing Market and Agglomeration of Rent-Seeking Activities: Implications for Regional Development," ERSA conference papers ersa14p326, European Regional Science Association.
- Alexeev, Michael & Natkhov, Timur & Polishchuk, Leonid, 2024. "Institutions, abilities, and the allocation of talent: Evidence from Russian regions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 271-296.
- Yu‐Bong Lai, 2020. "Rent‐seeking, R&D, and productivity," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(4), pages 404-419, September.
- Støstad, Morten Nyborg & Cowell, Frank, 2024.
"Inequality as an externality: Consequences for tax design,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
- Morten Nyborg Støstad & Frank Cowell, 2021. "Inequality as an Externality: Consequences for Tax Design," PSE Working Papers halshs-03495989, HAL.
- Støstad, Morten Nyborg & Cowell, Frank, 2024. "Inequality as an externality: consequences for tax design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123752, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Morten Nyborg Støstad & Frank Cowell, 2021. "Inequality as an Externality: Consequences for Tax Design," Working Papers halshs-03495989, HAL.
- Alex Bell & Raj Chetty & Xavier Jaravel & Neviana Petkova & John Van Reenen, 2019.
"Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(2), pages 647-713.
- Alex Bell & Raj Chetty & Xavier Jaravel & Neviana Petkova & John Van Reenen, 2017. "Who becomes an inventor in America? The importance of exposure to innovation," CEP Discussion Papers dp1519, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Bell, Alex & Chetty, Raj & Jaravel, Xavier & Petkova, Neviana & Van Reenen, John, 2019. "Who becomes an inventor in America? The importance of exposure to innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101434, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alexander M. Bell & Raj Chetty & Xavier Jaravel & Neviana Petkova & John Van Reenen, 2017. "Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation," NBER Working Papers 24062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Van Reenen, John & Bell, Alexander & Chetty, Raj & Jaravel, Xavier & Petkova, Neviana, 2017. "Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 12544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bell, Alex & Chetty, Raj & Jaravel, Xavier & Petkova, Neviana & Van Reenen, John, 2017. "Who becomes an inventor in America? The importance of exposure to innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86616, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
- Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018.
"Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
- Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
- Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021.
"Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments,"
NBER Working Papers
29160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dávila, Eduardo & Walther, Ansgar, 2022. "Corrective regulation with imperfect instruments," ESRB Working Paper Series 139, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Dávila, Eduardo & Walther, Ansgar, 2022. "Corrective regulation with imperfect instruments," Working Paper Series 2723, European Central Bank.
- Walther, Ansgar & Dávila, Eduardo, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," CEPR Discussion Papers 16448, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2295, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dávila, Eduardo & Walther, Ansgar, 2022. "Corrective regulation with imperfect instruments," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 20220, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Metsuyanim, Kfir & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015.
"Democracy with group identity,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 274-287.
- Arye L. Hillman & Kfir Metsuyanim & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Democracy with Group Identity," CESifo Working Paper Series 5281, CESifo.
- Arye L. Hillman & Kfir Metsuyanim & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Democracy With Group Identity," Working Papers 2015-02, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Florian Scheuer, 2014.
"Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 126-163, May.
- Florian Scheuer, 2013. "Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry," NBER Working Papers 19235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywords
rent-seeking; economic waste; inequality; monopolization; contest;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CWA-2021-11-15 (Central and Western Asia)
- NEP-LAB-2021-11-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2021-11-15 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2021-11-15 (Operations Research)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9375. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.