IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/zbw/wzbmbh/spii2014210.html

The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2017. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp," NBER Working Papers 23265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2025. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority‐Based Matching," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(4), August.
  3. Cantillon, Estelle & Chen, Li & Pereyra, Juan S., 2024. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 82-96.
  4. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024. "School choice with transferable student characteristics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
  5. Auster, I., 2025. "On the manipulability of the constrained Gale-Shapley and Boston school choice mechanisms. Part 2. Comparing harm of manipulations," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 12-35.
  6. Pycia, Marek & Unver, Utku, 2017. "Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  7. Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2014. "Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  8. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
  9. Pablo Guillen & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2017. "Not quite the best response: truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 670-686, September.
  10. Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 64, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  11. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "School choice with farsighted students," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 148-163.
  12. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
  13. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
  14. Duddy, Conal, 2015. "Revising the school choice problem," MPRA Paper 63316, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  16. Guillén, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2015. "How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: A field experiment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  17. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  18. Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2018. "The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 505-511.
  19. Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers, 2022. "Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 556-582, November.
  20. Jiao, Zhenhua & Shen, Ziyang, 2020. "On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  21. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  22. Roy Chen & Peter Katuščák & Thomas Kittsteiner & Katharina Kütter, 2024. "Does disappointment aversion explain non-truthful reporting in strategy-proof mechanisms?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(5), pages 1184-1210, November.
  23. Inácio Bó & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2024. "Pick-an-Object Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(7), pages 4693-4721, July.
  24. Guillen, Pablo & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2015. "Less is more: A Field Experiment on Matching," Working Papers 2015-16, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  25. repec:syd:wpaper:2123/9951 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, 2024. "Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 49-56.
  27. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  28. Martin Bichler & Alexander Hammerl & Thayer Morrill & Stefan Waldherr, 2021. "How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 335-355, June.
  29. Rong, Kang & Tang, Qianfeng & Zhang, Yongchao, 2020. "On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  30. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  31. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  32. Aram Grigoryan, 2023. "Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 383-396, April.
  33. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
  34. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 916, Boston College Department of Economics.
  35. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.