On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545
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More about this item
Keywords
Top trading cycles mechanism; Affirmative action; Responsiveness; Virtual homogeneity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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