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Citations for "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks"

by Stephen Morris & Bernardo Guimaraes

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  1. Campos, Rodolfo G., 2013. "Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1624-1658.
  2. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
  3. Junichi Fujimoto, 2014. "Speculative attacks with multiple targets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 89-132, September.
  4. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc, 2011. "Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 14-24, September.
  5. Steiner, Jakub & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2008. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-27, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  6. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2004.
  7. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets," CEIS Research Paper 245, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Jul 2012.
  8. Iachan, Felipe S. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2015. "Information quality and crises in regime-change games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 739-768.
  9. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2205-2230, November.
  10. Laurent Mathevet & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp459, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  11. Todd Keister, 2009. "Expectations And Contagion In Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 991-1012, 08.
  12. Geir H. Bjønnes & Steinar Holden & Dagfinn Rime & Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, 2009. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," CESifo Working Paper Series 2518, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Influential Opinion Leaders," Discussion Papers 1485, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Tamgac, Unay, 2011. "Crisis and self-fulfilling expectations: The Turkish experience in 1994 and 2000-2001," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 44-58, January.
  15. Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2013. "Contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 386-400.
  16. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Eduardo A. Cavallo, 2004. "Does Openness to Trade Make Countries More Vulnerable to Sudden Stops, Or Less? Using Gravity to Establish Causality," NBER Working Papers 10957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Guimarães, Bernardo & PEREIRA, Ana Elisa, 2015. "Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents," Textos para discussão 380, Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  18. Pavan, Alessandro & Angeletos, George-Marios, 2013. "Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  19. Dasgupta, Amil, 2007. "Coordination and delay in global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 195-225, May.
  20. Tijmen R. Daniels & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2008. "Defending against Speculative Attacks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-090/2, Tinbergen Institute, revised 06 Apr 2009.
  21. Mathevet, Laurent & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Tractable dynamic global games and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2583-2619.
  22. Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann & Tijmen R. Daniëls, 2013. "Crossing Network versus Dealer Market: Unique Equilibrium in the Allocation of Order Flow," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  23. Tijmen Daniëls, 2009. "Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 417-439, December.
  24. Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Intertemporal coordination with delay options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 793-810.
  25. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.