Persuasion via Weak Institutions

Citations

Cited by:

1. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
2. Sangjun Yea & Daeyoung Jeong, 2026. "Persuasion under the Influence of Fake News: Competitive Persuasion under Source Uncertainty," Working papers 2026rwp-295, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
3. Ailing Xu & Zhenxiao Chen & Qiao-Chu He & Ying-Ju Chen, 2026. "Strategic Communications with Socializing Agents Under Unknown Public Health Threats," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 42-56, January.
4. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
5. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
   • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
   • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
6. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2024. "Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
7. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. Jingyu Liu & Bolin Zhang & Lin William Cong & Siguang Li & Xuechao Wang, 2026. "From PBS to ePBS: the Microstructure of Block Building," Papers 2607.11240, arXiv.org.
9. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
10. Zhicheng Du & Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2026. "Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions," Papers 2605.03621, arXiv.org.
11. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2025. "Does costly persuasion signal quality?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(PB).
12. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
13. Luo, Zhaotian & Rozenas, Arturas, 2025. "Lying in persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-112.
14. Kreutzkamp, Sophie & Lou, Yichuan, 2025. "Persuasion without ex-post commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
15. Yifan Dai & Drew Fudenberg & Harry Pei, 2026. "Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure," Papers 2601.05914, arXiv.org.
16. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
17. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
18. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
19. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
20. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
21. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
22. Bergemann, Dirk & Gan, Tan & Li, Yingkai, 2026. "Managing persuasion robustly: The optimality of quota rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    • Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Papers 2310.10024, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2026.
    • Bergemann, Dirk & Gan, Tan & Li, Yingkai, 2026. "Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 140351, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2372, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
23. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    • Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021. "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series 651, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
24. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," Papers 2207.04929, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    • Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_470, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 199, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
25. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
26. Ronen Gradwohl & Fengming Hu & Rann Smorodinsky, 2026. "Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences," Papers 2605.28265, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2026.