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Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules

Author

Listed:
  • Bergemann, Dirk
  • Gan, Tan
  • Li, Yingkai

Abstract

We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender’s true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max competitive ratio as special cases. Across all criteria, the same answer emerges: the optimal rule is always a quota rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergemann, Dirk & Gan, Tan & Li, Yingkai, 2026. "Managing persuasion robustly: the optimality of quota rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 140351, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:140351
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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