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Scale-robust Auctions

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Listed:
  • Jason Hartline
  • Aleck Johnsen
  • Yingkai Li

Abstract

We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism is scale invariant, which randomizes between selling at the second-price and a 2.45 multiple of the second-price.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen & Yingkai Li, 2025. "Scale-robust Auctions," Papers 2510.21231, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2510.21231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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