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Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information

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  • Zhihao Gavin Tang
  • Shixin Wang

Abstract

In practice, auction data are often endogenously censored and anonymous, revealing only limited outcome statistics rather than full bid profiles. We study robust auction design when the seller observes only aggregated, anonymous order statistics and seeks to maximize worst-case expected revenue over all product distributions consistent with the observed statistic. We show that simple and widely used mechanisms are robustly optimal. Specifically, posted pricing is robustly optimal given the distribution of the highest value; the Myerson auction designed for the unique consistent i.i.d. distribution is robustly optimal given the lowest value distribution; and the second-price auction with an optimal reserve is robustly optimal when an intermediate order statistic is observed and the implied i.i.d. distribution is regular above its reserve. More generally, for a broad class of monotone symmetric mechanisms depending only on the top k order statistics, including multi-unit and position auctions, the worst-case revenue is attained under the i.i.d. distribution consistent with the observed k-th order statistic. Our results provide a tractable foundation for non-discriminatory auction design, where fairness and privacy are intrinsic consequences of the information structure rather than imposed constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhihao Gavin Tang & Shixin Wang, 2026. "Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information," Papers 2602.20429, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2602.20429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
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