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Description Complexity of Regular Distributions

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  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Balasubramanian Sivan
  • Yifeng Teng
  • Pratik Worah

Abstract

Myerson's regularity condition of a distribution is a standard assumption in economics. In this paper, we study the complexity of describing a regular distribution within a small statistical distance. Our main result is that $\tilde{\Theta}{(\epsilon^{-0.5})}$ bits are necessary and sufficient to describe a regular distribution with support $[0,1]$ within $\epsilon$ Levy distance. We prove this by showing that we can learn the regular distribution approximately with $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-0.5})$ queries to the cumulative density function. As a corollary, we show that the pricing query complexity to learn the class of regular distribution with support $[0,1]$ within $\epsilon$ Levy distance is $\tilde{\Theta}{(\epsilon^{-2.5})}$. To learn the mixture of two regular distributions, $\tilde{\Theta}(\epsilon^{-3})$ pricing queries are required.

Suggested Citation

  • Renato Paes Leme & Balasubramanian Sivan & Yifeng Teng & Pratik Worah, 2023. "Description Complexity of Regular Distributions," Papers 2305.05590, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.05590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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