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Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism

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Cited by:

  1. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 205-209, May.
  2. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1035, Boston College Department of Economics.
  3. Jonathan Ma & Scott Duke Kominers, 2018. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 19-011, Harvard Business School.
  4. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
  5. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2012. "On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 984-989.
  6. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Dynamic reserves in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  7. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
  8. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Unver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing," NBER Working Papers 26951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," NBER Working Papers 26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
  11. Battal Doğan & Serhat Doğan & Kemal Yıldız, 2021. "Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 172-196, February.
  12. Abizada, Azar, 2016. "Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  13. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2014. "College Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E24, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  14. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1143-1176, May.
  15. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
  16. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2016. "Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.11, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  17. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2015. "Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 552-573.
  18. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.
  19. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017. "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 656-665.
  20. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
  21. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS, 2016. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings," Cahiers de recherche 13-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  22. Kominers, Scott Duke & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2016. "Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  23. Orhan Aygün & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Matching with Contracts: The Critical Role of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 804, Boston College Department of Economics.
  24. Yamaguchi, Tomoaki & Yahiro, Kentaro & Yokoo, Makoto, 2019. "Student-Project-Resource Matching-Allocation Problems: Game Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 92720, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2018. "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
  26. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Avinatan Hassidim & Déborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 220-224, May.
  28. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020. "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.
  29. Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez, 2013. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 2050-2051, August.
  30. Pathak, Parag A. & Shi, Peng, 2021. "How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 161-195.
  31. Orhan Aygün & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "The Importance of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts in Matching under Weakened Substitutes Conditions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 805, Boston College Department of Economics.
  32. Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao, 2017. "Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 56-68.
  33. In'acio B'o & Li Chen, 2021. "Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service," Papers 2105.02457, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
  34. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
  35. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2018. "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labor Market for Lawyers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 68, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  36. Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2020. "Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 101-133, January.
  37. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.
  38. Azar Abizada, 2017. "Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 879-890, August.
  39. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
  40. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
  41. Benjamin Tello, 2022. "Stability and Contractual Efficiency in Matching with Contracts and Lexicographic Preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(1), pages 41-48.
  42. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
  43. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2017. "Dual‐Donor Organ Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1645-1671, September.
  44. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2021. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process," Papers 2106.06582, arXiv.org.
  45. Fragiadakis, Daniel E. & Troyan, Peter, 2019. "Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 232-252.
  46. P'eter Bir'o & Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer & S'andor S'ov'ag'o, 2020. "The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence," Papers 2010.08631, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  47. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2015. "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113153, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  48. Philipp D. Dimakopoulos & Christian-Philipp Heller, "undated". "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014005, Berlin School of Economics.
  49. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1015, Boston College Department of Economics.
  50. Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Job security, stability and production efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  51. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  52. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 937-965, July.
  53. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 977, Boston College Department of Economics.
  54. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz & Turhan, Bertan, 2015. "On relationships between substitutes conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 10-12.
  55. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2014. "Cumulative offer process is order-independent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 37-40.
  56. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  57. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2019. "Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules," ISU General Staff Papers 20191101070000, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  58. Marek Bojko, 2020. "The Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas," Papers 2012.11028, arXiv.org.
  59. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1026, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Jun 2021.
  60. Kojima, Fuhito & Tamura, Akihisa & Yokoo, Makoto, 2018. "Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 803-833.
  61. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2017. "On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 27-43.
  62. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
  63. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces," Discussion Papers 16/14, Department of Economics, University of York.
  64. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2019. "Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 121-142.
  65. Sean Horan & Vikram Manjunath, 2022. "Lexicographic Composition of Choice Functions," Papers 2209.09293, arXiv.org.
  66. Devansh Jalota & Michael Ostrovsky & Marco Pavone, 2022. "Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints," Papers 2202.05232, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  67. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
  68. Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2017. "Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 200-204, May.
  69. Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.
  70. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2017. "Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 107-142.
  71. Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
  72. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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