IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/taf/fglcxx/v11y2010i3p279-297.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Criminal constitutions

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
  2. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
  3. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, January.
  4. David Skarbek & Peng Wang, 2015. "Criminal rituals," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 288-305, October.
  5. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati, 2012. "Indirect Effects of a Policy Altering Criminal Behavior: Evidence from the Italian Prison Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 199-218, April.
  6. Harris, Colin, 2018. "Institutional solutions to free-riding in peer-to-peer networks: a case study of online pirate communities," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 901-924, October.
  7. Roberto Galbiati & Arnaud Philippe, 2014. "3. Enfermez-les tous ! Dissuasion et effets pervers des politiques répressives," Regards croisés sur l'économie, La Découverte, vol. 0(1), pages 44-57.
  8. Golz, Michael & D'Amico, Daniel J., 2018. "Market concentration in the international drug trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 28-42.
  9. Marciano, Alain & Ramello, Giovanni B., 2019. "Introduction to the symposium on the empirics of judicial institutions," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 73-80, February.
  10. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
  11. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.
  12. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  13. James Kostelnik & David Skarbek, 2013. "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 95-103, July.
  14. Catino, Maurizio, 2015. "Mafia rules. The role of criminal codes in mafia organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 536-548.
  15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9l61c56pa6 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
  17. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
  18. Peter T. Leeson & David B. Skarbek, 2010. "Criminal constitutions," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 279-297, August.
  19. Escalante, Edwar E., 2020. "Night watchers and terrorists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 116-131.
  20. Peter T. Leeson & Daniel J. Smith & Nicholas A. Snow, 2012. "Hooligans," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 213-231.
  21. Daniel J. D'Amico, 2017. "The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(5), pages 1107-1132, November.
  22. Lessing, Benjamin & Willis, Graham Denyer, 2019. "Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 584-606, May.
  23. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
  24. Nicholas A. Curott & Alexander Fink, 2012. "Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical, or Rational?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 470-497, April.
  25. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2020. "Altruism, predation and the Samaritan's dilemma," Working Papers hal-02550432, HAL.
  26. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  27. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.
  28. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
  29. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.