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Citations for "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

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  1. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9889, 01-2013.
  4. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  7. Yukio Koriyama & Peter Gruner, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Post-Print hal-00689774, HAL.
  8. Vasconcelos, Luís, 2014. "Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 19-33.
  9. Engelmann, Dirk & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2014. "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100600, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  13. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  14. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Schweizer, Urs, 1998. "Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results," Discussion Paper Serie A 590, University of Bonn, Germany.
  16. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
  20. Hori Kazumi, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-9, July.
  21. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  22. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), : The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  23. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
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