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Citations for "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

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  1. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  2. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Yukio Koriyama & Peter Gruner, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Post-Print hal-00689774, HAL.
  4. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  5. Engelmann, Dirk & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2013. "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 9544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
  7. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  11. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  16. Hori, Kazumi, 2005. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," Discussion Papers 2005-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  17. Schweizer, Urs, 1998. "Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results," Discussion Paper Serie A 590, University of Bonn, Germany.
  18. Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
  19. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  20. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
  21. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  23. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
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