What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co
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- Roig, Guillem, 2014. "Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts," TSE Working Papers 14-481, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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More about this item
Keywords
cooperative investment; investment distribution; competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2014-04-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2014-04-29 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2014-04-29 (Microeconomics)
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