Do we need handshakes to cooperate in buyer-supplier relationships?
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.210389
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- José De Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2010. "Do we need handshakes to cooperate in buyer-supplier relationships?," Working Papers SMART 10-13, INRAE UMR SMART.
- José De Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2009. "Do we need handshakes to cooperate in buyer-supplier relationships?," Documents de recherche 09-15, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
International Relations/Trade;JEL classification:
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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