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Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
  2. Brian Bell & Simone Pedemonte & John Van Reenen, 2021. "Ceo Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2513-2542.
  3. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Luo, Robin Yifan & Michaeli, Beatrice, 2024. "In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
  5. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated". "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," FMG Discussion Papers dp713, Financial Markets Group.
  6. Liu, Bo & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2017. "Dynamic agency and investment theory with time-inconsistent preferences," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 88-95.
  7. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.
  8. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
  9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  10. li, Hong & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2016. "Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 519-530.
  11. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391936, HAL.
  13. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  14. Yang, Zeyu & Zhuo, Jiayi & Zhang, Yuqian, 2024. "Risk management and optimal investment with inalienable human capital," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  15. Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017. "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk," Working Paper 17-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  16. Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018. "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 141-157, July.
  17. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  18. de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Smith, Alexander & Spraggon, John, 2017. "Reward the lucky? An experimental investigation of the impact of agency and luck on bonuses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 87-97.
  19. Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," Working Papers hal-03124102, HAL.
  20. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  21. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
  22. Rui Li & Noah Williams, 2025. "Optimal contracts with hidden risk," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 58, October.
  23. Niu, Yingjie & Zou, Zhentao, 2024. "Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 196-217.
  24. Hengjie Ai & Rui Li, 2012. "Moral hazard, investment, and firm dynamics," FRB Atlanta CQER Working Paper 2012-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  25. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  26. Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2017. "Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 40-58.
  27. Wang, Ying & Huang, Wenli & Liu, Bo & Zhang, Xiaohong, 2020. "Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
  28. Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016. "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers 1164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  29. Brett Green & Curtis R. Taylor, 2016. "Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3660-3699, December.
  30. Martin, Jessica & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," TSE Working Papers 21-1183, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  31. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
  32. Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
  33. Jonathan Wiley & Brandon Cline & Xudong Fu & Tian Tang, 2012. "Valuation Effects for Asset Sales," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 41(3), pages 103-120, June.
  34. Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022. "Self-enforcing contracts with persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 72-87.
  35. Jessica Martin & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," Papers 2102.00001, arXiv.org.
  36. Xi Chen & Yu Chen & Xuhu Wan, 2018. "Delegated Project Search," Graz Economics Papers 2018-11, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  37. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  38. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03391936, HAL.
  39. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  40. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  41. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
  42. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  43. Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
  45. Vincent Tena, 2023. "The Consequences of Regulating Agency Friction on an Optimal Contract," Post-Print hal-04722609, HAL.
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